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Trademarks in Cyberspace: 
The Pseudo-Abrogation of the Territoriality Principle  
Chad J. Doellinger* 
I. Introduction.  
"The Internet represents a revolutionary advance in communication technology.  It has 
been suggested that the Internet may be the 'greatest innovation in speech since the 
invention of the printing press[.]' It allows people from all over the world to exchange 
ideas and information freely and in 'real-time.'"1  Thus, the Internet has eliminated all 
traditional boundaries and borders.  Trademark law, on the other hand, is based on the 
principle of territoriality.  In other words, two companies can use the same mark in 
geographically remote areas.  As Professor McCarthy explains, "a trademark is 
recognized as having a separate existence in each sovereign territory in which it is 
registered or legally recognized as a mark."2 
The tension between the Internet and trademark law is thus clear.  How can territorial 
rights be respected in a medium that respects no boarders?  What happens when a United 
States company and a foreign company, both with trademark rights in their respective 
countries, move online?  This problem was summarized by one court several years ago:  
"The challenge for the courts is to recognize that the Internet has erased [the geographic] 
boundaries while still respecting both trademark rights and the limits of those rights."3  
Courts and commentators alike have struggled with this challenge.  Seduced by the 
novelty of the Internet and infatuated with cutting-edge "Internet law," long standing 
principles of trademark law have been shunned.  One commentator, reacting to the 
Internet, recently proclaimed that "[d]ogmatic territoriality, when applied to intellectual 
property, ignores basic reality."4  He concluded that "the territorial model of trademark 
law in such a world is an anachronism."5  Given this conventional wisdom, it is no 
wonder that courts have struggled defining trademark rights within context of the 
Internet.  This struggle is aptly illustrated in Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Chuckleberry 
Publishing, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
II. Territoriality Rejected:  
Since 1967, Chuckleberry Publishing ("Chuckleberry") published a male sophisticated 
magazine in Italy under the name Playmen.  In 1979, Chuckleberry announced its plans 
to publish a version of the magazine for the United States.  Playboy Enterprises objected 
to the use of PLAYMEN, and in 1981, a United States court permanently enjoined 
Chuckleberry from using the word PLAYMEN within the United States.  Playboy also 
sought and received similar injunctions in other countries including England, France and 
West Germany.  Playboy tried, but failed, to obtain such relief in Italy.  Thus, 
Chuckleberry's use of PLAYMEN was permissible in Italy.    
Fifteen years after the injunction issued, Chuckleberry created an Internet web site 
located at <www.playmen.it>.6  This Italian web site contained images of the covers of 
the Italian magazine and other sexually explicit images.  At the site, users had two 
options:  PLAYMEN Lite and PLAYMEN Pro.  The PLAYMEN Lite version allowed 
viewers to see moderately explicit images without paying or needing a password.  Thus, 
anyone who visited PLAYMEN Lite (from any country) could view these images.  The 
PLAYMEN Pro version was a more explicit version of PLAYMEN Lite and required a 
paid subscription.  To obtain this service, a web user was required to fill out a form and 
then received a unique password from Chuckleberry.   
The district court found that both versions of the Italian web site were in violation of its 
injunction and Playboy's United States' trademark rights.  The court ordered that 
"[Defendant] must either shut down PLAYMEN Lite completely or prohibit United 
States users from accessing the site."7   If Chuckleberry attempted to screen United 
States' users in its PLAYMEN Lite version by requiring password access (analogous to 
the PLAYMEN Pro version), the court required near perfect accuracy: "If technology 
cannot identify the country of origin of e-mail addresses, these passwords and user IDs 
should be sent by mail.  Only in this way can the Court be assured that United States 
users are not accidentally permitted access to PLAYMEN Lite."8  Thus, the court's order 
effectively required Chuckleberry to shut down its web site and prevent anyone, 
anywhere in the world, from viewing it, in spite of Chuckleberry's rights in Italy.9 
Ironically, the court cautioned that territoriality must not be ignored: "[Defendant] cannot 
be prohibited from operating its Internet site merely because the site is accessible from 
within one country in which its product is banned.  To hold otherwise 'would be 
tantamount to a declaration that this Court, and every other court throughout the world, 
may assert jurisdiction over all information providers on the global World Wide 
Web.'"10  The court continued by stating that "[s]uch a holding would have a devastating 
impact on those who use this global service."11  Yet this is precisely what the court did.   
The court determined that any possible access to defendant's Italian web site in the 
United States was a violation of the injunction and Playboy's trademark rights:  "The 
PLAYMEN Internet site is widely available to patrons living in the United States.  More 
to the point, anyone in the United States with access to the Internet has the capacity to 
browse the PLAYMEN Internet site, review, and obtain print and electronic copies of 
sexually explicit pages of PLAYMEN magazine."12  Thus, the court disregarded 
defendant's rights in Italy (and the fundamental limiting principle of United States 
trademark law) and granted Playboy a universal trademark, at least in the online world.  
The court attempted to distance itself from this necessary implication by once again 
paying lip service to the principle of territoriality:  "While this Court has neither the 
jurisdiction nor the desire to prohibit the creation of Internet sites around the globe, it 
may prohibit access to those sites in this country."13  This is a distinction without a 
difference.  Given the way the Internet operates, prohibiting a web site access in certain 
countries is the same as prohibiting the web site around the world.14  
To reach its conclusion, the Chucklebery Court had to sever ties with well-established 
principles of trademark law.  It, too, was seduced by "cyberlaw."   The novelty of the 
Internet does not require (or justify) a departure with the law.  As one early court 
explained, "[s]ome of the evidence in this case strongly suggests that some companies 
operating in the area of the Internet may have a misconception that, because their 
technology is somewhat novel, they are somehow immune from the ordinary applications 
of laws of the United States . . . . They need to understand that the law's domain knows 
no such limits."15  Judge Easterbrook provided similar advice to courts: "[K]eep doing 
what you have been doing. Most behavior in cyberspace is easy to classify under current 
property principles."16   
III. Back to Business As Usual:  
Although trademark disputes involving the Internet provide interesting new fact patterns, 
the underlying problems are not new at all.  Territoriality has been at odds with the global 
nature of the world economy for the last fifty years.17  Thus, courts must resist the 
temptation to make law and instead use well-established common law principles of 
analogic reasoning to apply traditional brick-and-mortar law to cyberspace.  Examining 
how courts have historically dealt with these problems will provide guidance on how to 
deal with these problems in the context of the Internet.  Specifically, trademark law has 
evolved to accommodate this tension while maintaining the proper balance of rights and 
the limits on those rights.  Thus, appealing to the jurisprudence relating to extraterritorial 
injunctions, spill-over advertising and permissible national advertising provides much 
needed clarity and direction.  Applying these established solutions to traditional problems 
manifesting in a new context allows for the healthy development of trademark law and 
provide consistency in the law. 
A. Extra-territorial Injunctions  
Since a United States' court has the power to shut down activities outside of the United 
States,18  there is nothing per se improper with a district court prohibiting a web site 
originating in a foreign country as was done in Chuckleberry.  This power was 
established in 1952, in Steele v. Bulova Watch Company.19  In Bulova, a United States 
court enjoined the defendant from engaging in infringing acts in Mexico.  Courts have 
interpreted this holding as requiring three elements for an extra-territorial injunction to be 
proper: "(1) the defendant's conduct must have a substantial effect on United States 
commerce, (2) the defendant must be a United States citizen and (3) there can be no valid 
trademark registration in the foreign country and no conflict with trademark rights 
conferred by that foreign country."20  Thus, an extra-territorial injunction cannot stand 
absent a court's careful analysis of its power to issue such an injunction and a careful 
application of the Steele factors.21   
While courts possess this broad power, it should be exercised with caution.22  As one 
court explained, "[w]here . . . both parties have legitimate interests, consideration of those 
interests must receive especially sensitive accommodation in the international 
context."23  For example, in Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633 (2d 
Cir. 1956), an American clothing manufacturer attempted to enjoin a Canadian retailer 
selling similar goods in Canada.  The court dismissed the claim "because it was a 
Canadian corporation using a mark to which it held presumably valid trademark rights in 
Canada."24 
The Chuckleberry court ignored the extraterritorial reach of its order and thus disregarded 
the Bulova standard.  Because the context was slightly different, the court failed to realize 
the jurisprudence of extraterritorial injunctions is well-settled and fully developed.  Had 
the court applied the Bulova standard and its progeny, it is unlikely Playboy would have 
been able to establish even a single one of the three factors.  Chuckleberry was not a 
United States' citizen and defendant had rights outside in Italy.  Moreover, the actual 
effect defendant's web site had on United States' commerce, and specifically plaintiff's 
rights, was assumed rather than proven.25   Thus, had the court carefully applied the 
Supreme Court's test in enjoining defendant, much of the apparent tension it experienced 
would have been resolved. 
B. Spill Over Doctrine  
The Chuckleberry court seemed bothered that some of defendant's advertising26 might 
reach an area in which it had no rights.  Because defendant's Internet web site allowed for 
this possibility, the court determined that it necessarily violated Playboy's rights.27  Once 
again, this conclusion ignored well-established principles of trademark law.  As Professor 
McCarthy explained, "[i]n today's economy, some 'spill-over' advertising from one nation 
to another is inevitable."28  Thus, "[t]he doctrine of territoriality demands that incidental 
spill-over of advertising from one nation to another be significant and substantial before 
it should be enjoined."29  The court failed to find that the effect of the PLAYMEN Lite 
web site was significant and substantial.  In fact, the court did not even consider how 
many United States citizens accessed the web site.  
In addition, the problem of spill-over advertising faced by the Chuckleberry court is 
nothing new.  In fact, a court dealt with a nearly identical problem in the brick-and-
mortar context almost a decade ago.  In Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Bayer AG, 14 F.3d 733 (2d 
Cir. 1994), the district court resolved the problem in much the same way as the 
Chuckleberry court.  Defendant was enjoined from using its mark in the United States as 
well as abroad if that use might reach the United States. The Second Circuit, relying on 
traditional principles of trademark law, held that the injunction was too broad.  
The Second Circuit Court explained:  "In today's global economy, where a foreign TV 
advertisement might be available by satellite to U.S. households, not every activity of a 
foreign corporation with any tendency to create some confusion among American 
consumers can be prohibited by the extraterritorial reach of a District Court's 
injunction."30  Thus, "[i]n establishing the parameters of injunctive relief in the case of 
lawful concurrent users, a court must take into account the realities of the 
marketplace."31  The court suggested that the district court may require defendant "to 
take appropriate precautions against using the mark in international media in ways that 
might create confusion among United States consumers."32  While Sterling Drugs did 
not involve the Internet, its insights regarding spill-over advertising and international 
media provide key insights lacking in Chuckleberry.  The Sterling Drugs Court carefully 
balanced both parties' rights advocating "appropriate precautions" with regard to 
international media33 rather than an absolute bar with respect to such media.  
Professor McCarthy warned of the dangers associated with attempting to eliminate all 
spill-over advertising: "An injunction by a U.S. court against trademark infringement 
triggered merely by 'spill-over' advertising would necessarily require the foreign 
company to stop all use of the mark because of the inevitability of spill-over in today's 
global economy.  This would require a foreign corporation to cease, in that foreign 
nation, the use of a mark which is legally its property under the laws of that nation.  Such 
an injunction would not only violate the principle of trademark territoriality by expanding 
United States trademark rights into foreign nations, but would also violate the principle of 
comity among the law of courts of different nations."34  This is precisely what happened 
in Chuckleberry.  Playboy was unable to obtain its desired relief in Italy,35 yet the 
breadth of the injunction issued by the U.S. district court provided Playboy with much, if 
not all, of the relief it desired.  Thus, the Chuckleberry Court violated the principle of 
trademark territoriality and the principle of comity. 
C. Permissible National Advertising  
In addition to spill-over advertising, courts will allow some advertising into territories 
where the senior user has no rights where permissible concurrent use is occurring.  For 
example, in All Video, Inc. v. Hollywood Entertainment Corp., 929 F. Supp. 262 (E.D. 
Mich. 1996), the court permitted national advertising on the radio and in newspapers 
even though this would reach the territories in which the parties did not have rights.  The 
court acknowledged that "there will be some confusion caused by radio and print 
advertising."36  The court justified its holding as consistent with the Lanham Act:  
"While we recognize that some consumer confusion may result because there will be 
some overlap in advertising, the Lanham Act does not require the complete elimination of 
all confusion."37   One court addressed an analogous situation in the Internet context.  In  
Allard Enterprises, Inc. v. Advanced Programming Resources, Inc., 249 F.3d 564 (6th 
Cir. 2001), the court "decline[d] to affirm the district court's conclusion that an injunction 
prohibiting [plaintiff's] use of the mark in a specific geographic area necessarily 
precludes any use of the mark by [plaintiff] on the internet."38    
These holdings are in direct contrast to the holding in Chuckleberry.  There, the court 
determined that, because defendant had no rights in the United States, defendant should 
be absolutely precluded from using any Internet web site accessible in the United States 
(which, of course, means any Internet web site at all).  In so doing, the court disregarded 
fundamental principles of trademark law. 
IV. Conclusion:  
The Chuckleberry case is merely an example of the types of problems courts face in 
trying to enforce trademark rights on the Internet.  The Internet has revolutionized the 
way people interact, communicate and do business.  Nevertheless, the legal problems 
created by the Internet are not necessarily new and thus do not warrant disregarding a 
well-developed body of law and replacing it with a new law of the Internet.  Courts 
should avoid focusing on the novelty of the fact patterns.  Instead, courts must proceed 
cautiously looking to the well-established intellectual property jurisprudence for 
guidance.  For many years, courts have been dealing with the tension between territorial 
rights and the global market.  While the Internet may have made this tension more 
apparent, courts should resist the urge to jettison established principles of trademark law 
and instead should continue to rely on the equitable solutions developed over the last fifty 
years to resolve these issues.  
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